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APPLICATION OF THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
DOCTRINE AFTER KINGSDO WN
Erik R. Puknyst & Jared D. Schuettenhelmtt
Abstract
All individuals associated with prosecuting and filing patent
applications owe a duty of candor to the U.S. Patent Office, including
the obligation to disclose all information that is material to the
patentability of an invention. Where an applicant fails to comply with
this duty, challengers may seek to render the patent unenforceable by
charging the applicant with inequitable conduct. Responding to a vast
increase in inequitable conduct claims, the Federal Circuit in 1988
decided Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.,
enumerating clear requirements for an inequitable conduct ruling.
The Kingsdown court held that inequitable conduct requires a
showing of both materiality and intent to deceive by clear and
convincing evidence. Nevertheless, since Kingsdown, judges and
commentators have criticized the perceived erosion of the intent
element of inequitable conduct. Although Kingsdown requires a
finding of a specific intent to deceive, subsequent decisions have been
criticized for establishing a "should have known" standard for intent,
thus lowering the requirements specified in Kingsdown. This article
traces the development of the inequitable conduct doctrine leading up
the Kingsdown decision. It also summarizes a number of criticized
cases decided after Kingsdown, noting the perceived shift in the
intent analysis. Finally, this article discusses several recent cases that
may symbolize a shift to more rigorous requirements for intent to
deceive.
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tt Student Associate, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. The
authors wish to note that Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP represented
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are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett
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I. Introduction
The purpose of the patent system is to foster innovation and
progress by promoting the free flow of information to the public. In
order to achieve this purpose, the patent system provides a quidpro
quo, conferring a limited right to prevent others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell an invention in exchange for full public
disclosure.1 Thus, by conferring this limited right of exclusivity,
patents provide a valuable incentive for innovation. To obtain this
right, however, patentees must comply with numerous requirements.
Among these requirements, individuals associated with the filing or
prosecution of patent applications owe a duty of candor and good
faith to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). a This
duty includes an obligation to disclose any known information that is
material to patentability.3 By imposing this obligation, the PTO seeks
to ensure that individuals bring any references that may be relevant
for establishing patentability to an examiner's attention. Courts have
recognized the need to enforce this obligation to the PTO.
Developed from the equitable principle of unclean hands,
4
inequitable conduct originated as a mechanism to punish applicants
that committed willful fraud on the Patent Office. Courts understood
that a harsh remedy was necessary, both to penalize offenders and to
serve as a deterrent to future abuse of the patent system. Thus, the
"atomic bomb" remedy of unenforceability was intended to mitigate
the risk that applicants would knowingly mislead the Patent Office.5
Despite its original application to willful and intentional actions,
inequitable conduct was gradually expanded to include negligent
actions as well.6 Due to this expansion, it became commonplace to
charge inequitable conduct in virtually every litigated case,7 which
was not the original intent of the inequitable conduct defense. Indeed,
observers have opined that it was intended to punish "only the most
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
2. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008).
3. Id.
4. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15
(1945).
5. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
6. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
7. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (citing Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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extreme cases of fraud and deception."8 Nevertheless, alleged
infringers began pleading inequitable conduct so frequently that the
Federal Circuit eventually declared it a "plague" on the patent
system.
9
In the seminal case of Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v.
Hollister, Inc.,1° the Federal Circuit moved to quarantine this plague.
In Kingsdown, the court clarified the requirements for inequitable
conduct. In order to satisfy these requirements, the court held that an
omission or misrepresentation must be material to patentability and
must be made with the intent to deceive the Patent Office.' The court
also required that both materiality and deceitful intent be proven
separately by clear and convincing evidence.' 2 At the same time, the
court expressly rejected the notion that negligent or even grossly
negligent conduct alone could serve as the basis for an inequitable
conduct finding.' 3 Instead, a party "must have intended to act
inequitably" in order to be guilty of committing inequitable conduct. 14
Despite the standards enunciated in Kingsdown, an increasing
number of commentators and judges have noted an apparent return to
the "plague" of inequitable conduct charges.15 In particular, recent
decisions have been criticized for relaxing the intent element to
encompass actions that fall short of the substantial intent requirements
established by Kingsdown.' 6 A majority of criticism has been focused
on cases holding that specific intent to mislead the Patent Office may
be inferred from the materiality of an act or omission. Even more
controversial is the proposition that intent may be established when an
applicant knew, or should have known, of the materiality of an act or
omission. As a result of these decisions, some commentators have
8. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting).
9. Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422.
10. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d. 867.
11. Id. at 872.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 876.
14. Id. at 872 (emphasis added) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411,
1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
15. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
16. See Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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warned of a trend towards a strict liability standard for inequitable
conduct. 17
This article traces the early development of the inequitable
conduct doctrine, culminating in the seminal Kingsdown decision.
Further, it analyzes the subsequent application of the inequitable
conduct analysis. In the course of this overview, the article notes with
concern the seeming relaxation of the inequitable conduct analysis. Of
particular concern is the perceived lowering of the standard to prove
deceitful intent. By inferring intent from materiality, the two elements
of the inequitable conduct analysis appear to have merged. This is
difficult to reconcile with Kingsdown, which requires that both
elements be independently proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, this paper agrees with those judges and commentators that urge
a strict application of Kingsdown's standards. 18 Absent such an
application, we risk a return to the pre-Kingsdown "plague" of
inequitable conduct charges.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A. Buildup to the "Plague"
The doctrine of inequitable conduct can be traced to the Supreme
Court's 1945 decision in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.19 The facts of Precision
involved a patentee's particularly egregious and fraudulent conduct.
In this case, George Thomasma, an employee of Automotive
Performance Machinery (Automotive), misappropriated information
relating to the design of torque wrenches.20 Thomasma passed this
information to a partner, Kenneth Larson, and together they
developed plans for a new wrench. 2' After attempts to interest other
distributors failed, Larson entered into an agreement to provide Snap-
On tools with the new wrench.22 Larson prepared a patent application
for the wrench, but since he did not have the necessary funds to file
17. James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kerns, The Return of the Inequitable Conduct Plague:
When "7 Did Not Know" Unexpectedly Becomes "You Should Have Known, " INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. LAW J., Feb. 2007, at 5.
18. See generally id. See also Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting); Ferring,
437 F.3d at 1195 (Newman, J., dissenting).
19. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
20. Id. at 808.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 808-09.
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the application, he assigned it to Snap-On. 23 Snap-On filed the
application and took the assignment as security for performance of the
agreement to manufacture the wrenches.24 Subsequently, Larson,
Thomasma, and another partner, Walter Carlsen, formed Precision
Instrument Manufacturing (Precision) for the purpose of
manufacturing the wrench design. Meanwhile, Automotive filed a
patent application for a similar wrench.26 After receiving both
applications, the PTO declared an interference between Larson's
patent and Automotive's patent.27
Due to the misappropriation, Larson had no legitimate basis on
which to pursue the patent application. Rather than admit his
misconduct, however, he attempted to show priority of invention by
filing a fraudulent statement with the PTO designating false dates for
conception, disclosure, drawing, description, and reduction to
28practice. 8 In addition, Larson claimed that he was the sole inventor of
the wrench. 29 This did not sit well with Thomasma, who met with
representatives from Automotive and declared that he was actually
the inventor of Larson's wrench.30 Eventually realizing that he could
no longer maintain his position, Larson admitted to Snap-On that the
entire case was false.3'
In an interesting turn of events, Automotive saw an opportunity
to benefit from the situation. Rather than notify the PTO of Larson's
misconduct, Automotive negotiated a settlement which resulted in
three separate agreements among the parties.32 Under an agreement
between Automotive and Snap-On, Snap-On agreed to reassign the
Larson application to Precision and acknowledged the validity of the
claims on patents to issue from Larson and Automotive's
applications. 33 In exchange, Automotive gave Snap-On the right to
sell 6,000 wrenches previously ordered from Precision and released
Snap-On from all past liability or damages. 34 Under a separate
23. Id. at 809 & n.2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 809.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 810.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 811.
32. Id. at 813.
33. Id. at 813-14.
34. Id. at 814.
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agreement between Automotive and Precision-Larson, Larson
conceded priority to Automotive's patent.35 Larson also agreed to
assign his application to Automotive in exchange for a license
allowing Precision and Larson to complete the unfulfilled order for
6,000 wrenches.36 Further, Precision and Larson acknowledged the
validity of the claims in both applications.37 Finally, under an
agreement between Snap-On and Precision-Larson, Snap-On
reassigned any remaining title in the Larson application to Larson and
Precision.38
After the settlement, Automotive made a number of changes to
both applications and continued to prosecute them,39 never notifying
the PTO of Larson's fraudulent behavior.40  Eventually, both
applications matured into patents.' In a final twist of irony,
Automotive accused Precision of patent infringement and breach of
contract after Precision began to manufacture, and Snap-On began to
sell, a new wrench.42 The full details of these events were
subsequently uncovered during litigation.
At the outset, the court noted that matters concerning patents and
patent rights are closely tied to the public interest.43 Thus, the public
has a stake in ensuring that patents are not granted based on
fraudulent or misleading conduct by a patentee.
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. As
recognized by the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to
serve the public purpose of promoting the "Progress of Science and
useful Arts." At the same time, a patent is an exception to the
general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free
and open market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount
interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds
35. Id. at 813.
36. Id. As part of the settlement, Automotive also released Precision, Larson, and their
customers from liability for any past infringement and gave Precision and Larson a general
release as to all civil damages. Id.
37. Id. Although the case does not indicate why Precision and Larson acknowledged the
validity of the claims, Automotive presumably imposed this requirement as a condition of the
settlement.
38. Id. at 814.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 818.
41. Id. at 814.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 816.
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free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such
monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.
44
Analyzing both Larson and Automotive's conduct under the
doctrine of unclean hands, the Supreme Court declared that the
patents were "steeped in perjury and undisclosed knowledge of
perjury. The Court found that Automotive had a duty to disclose
this information, declaring that "Automotive knew and suppressed
facts that, at the very least, should have been brought in some way to
the attention of the Patent Office. ' ,46 The Supreme court concluded
that Automotive's failure to notify the Patent Office did not "conform
to minimum ethical standards. 47 As a result, "inequitable conduct
impregnated Automotive's entire cause of action and justified
dismissal by resort to the unclean hands doctrine. '48 Under these
circumstances, the Court determined that Automotive should not be
able to enforce the perjury-tainted patents.49
As Precision and other early Supreme Court cases demonstrate,
the inequitable conduct doctrine originated in actions involving
particularly egregious and fraudulent conduct. 50 Indeed, the courts
originally analyzed such cases under the charge of "fraud on the
Patent Office.",51 The standard for these actions was high, involving
intentional conduct meant to mislead or deceive the Patent Office.
While courts ultimately expanded the doctrine beyond the classical
definition of fraud to include a wide range of inequitable conduct,
courts continued to recognize that there must still be some element of
willfulness or bad faith.52
Unfortunately, the standard changed over time. Despite the
origin of the doctrine in actions for fraud, courts gradually relaxed the
lofty requirements for inequitable conduct. In a subsequent line of
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 818.
47. Id. at 816.
48. Id. at 819 (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245
(1933)).
49. Precision Instrument, 342 U.S. at 816.
50. See id. See also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245-46
(1944) (condemning "a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only
the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals"); Keystone, 290 U.S. at 243-44 (condemning
a "corrupt transaction" to "keep secret the details of [a] prior use" that would have cast doubt on
the patent's validity).
51. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 708 (1st Cir. 1981).
52. Digital Equip., 653 F.2d at 709.
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cases, the Federal Circuit even suggested that a finding of gross
negligence was sufficient to compel a finding of inequitable
conduct.53 Consequently, the inequitable conduct doctrine expanded
far beyond punishing fraudulent practices.54
In the absence of strict standards, the defense was "grossly
misused" and "charged in almost every case. 55 In fact, "it was
irrelevant whether the examiner was in fact deceived, or whether the
purported flaw in prosecution affected patentability, or whether the
action was an intentional misrepresentation or at worst negligence, or
whether the invention met the statutory requirements of
patentability. 56 Despite a patentee's best efforts, he or she could be
virtually assured of an inequitable conduct charge in subsequent
litigation, often placing the patentee in a no-win situation. For
example, Judge Newman noted that "if the inventor provided selected
references, he was accused of inequitable conduct in the selection;
and if he provided an entire search report, he was accused of burying
the significant references.,
57
In light of this explosion of inequitable conduct charges, "judges
came to believe that every inventor and every patent attorney
wallowed in sharp practice, 58 and "that all scientists [were] knaves
and all patent attorneys [were] jackals."59 This led the Federal Circuit
to lament that "the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost
every major patent case has become an absolute plague., 60 Indeed, the
court observed that "[r]eputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to
make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest
grounds.",61 Expressing its apparent frustration with the rampant abuse
of the doctrine, the Federal Circuit declared that "[a] patent litigant
should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge of
53. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (citing In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d
878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
54. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. ld at 1196.
57. Id. at 1196 n.l.
58. Id. at 1195.
59. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
60. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
61. Id.
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'inequitable conduct on the Patent Office' is a negative contribution
to the rightful administration of justice., 62
In the end, rather than focusing on patentability or validity,
litigants began to sift through every detail in the prosecution history,
trying to find some fact on which to base an inequitable conduct
charge. Armed with a "20-20 vision of hindsight," deep pockets, and
the benefits of long and detailed discovery, litigants would attempt to
uncover some act or omission to use as a basis for finding inequitable
conduct.63 Eventually, this "plague" prompted the Federal Circuit to
decide Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.,64 in an
effort "to bring objective standards and reasoned perspective to the
charge of inequitable conduct.,
65
B. Kingsdown: The Attempt to Eradicate the Plague
In Kingsdown, the Federal Circuit sought to mitigate the
proliferation of inequitable conduct charges and to set the standard for
an inequitable conduct finding. The case involved a mistake made by
an attorney during a complex patent prosecution for an ostomy
appliance6 6 that spanned a six and a half year period.6 7 The
prosecution involved "submission, rejection, amendment, and
renumbering [] of 118 claims, a continuation application, an appeal, a
petition to make special, and citation and discussion of 44
references. 68 After a succession of Office Actions and amendments,
the patentee submitted claim 50 of the parent application. 69 The
examiner initially rejected this claim for indefiniteness but, after the
patentee amended the claim, the examiner eventually allowed it.
70
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1420 (noting that the trial court "with the '20-20 vision of hindsight,' read the
patent entirely differently than did those concerned with its issue"). See N. Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing "the ease with which a
relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive");
Hoffmnann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that with a decreased
standard "every experiment done and not done, every scientific inference, every judgment or
belief, is fair game for opportunistic attack").
64. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
65. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
66. An ostomy appliance is a device for use by patients with openings in their abdominal
walls to release waste. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 869.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 870.
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Subsequently, the patentee filed a continuation application.71 In
the continuation application, the patent attorney filed both new claims
and claims that had previously been allowed in the parent
application.72 He also created a table detailing the relationship
between the claims in the continuation application and the previously
allowed claims.7 x In this table, the patent attorney indicated that claim
43 of the continuation corresponded to the amended claim 50 from
the parent application. 4 In reality, claim 43 in the patent attorney's
table actually corresponded to the unamended claim 50, which had
been rejected by the examiner for indefiniteness. 75 Neither the
attorney nor the examiner noticed the mistake and the patent
ultimately issued with the original claim 50.76 During subsequent
litigation, the district court found that the attorney was grossly
negligent in failing to catch the mistake7 7 and declared the patent
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.78 The district court came to
this conclusion without any evidence suggesting deceptive intent.79
Reversing the district court's ruling, the Federal Circuit
delineated the requirements for inequitable conduct. The court
observed that "[t]o be guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have
intended to act inequitably. ' 80 Thus, the court separated the
inequitable conduct analysis into two distinct elements, requiring the
challenger to prove:
1) The patentee failed to submit material information to the PTO,
or submitted false information; and
2) The material information was withheld or advanced with the
intent to deceive. 81
In addition, the court declared that both elements must be proven
separately by clear and convincing evidence and required that any
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 871.
76. Id. at 873.
77. Id. at 871-72.
78. Id. at 869.
79. Id. at 872.
80. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
81. Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
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evidence of good faith be considered in the inequitable conduct
calculus.
82
Addressing the intent element as it pertained to the facts of the
case, the court found that there was no evidence that the patent
attorney intended to act inequitably or that he intended to deceive the
Patent Office.83 The transfer of claims en masse was a ministerial
act.84 As such, the court acknowledged that it was prone to errors
resulting from mere inattention rather than intentional omission.85 In
short, there was nothing to suggest that this was anything more than
an inadvertent mistake.
More importantly, the en banc portion of the Kingsdown decision
expressly rejected the proposition that gross negligence may be used
to infer inequitable conduct. 86 It acknowledged that "[s]ome of [its]
opinions have suggested that a finding of gross negligence compels a
finding of intent to deceive., 87 But the court went on to expressly
overrule such cases, declaring that "a finding that particular conduct
amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of
intent to deceive. 88 Rather, the patentee's "conduct, viewed in light
of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must
indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive."
89
Further, as discussed in greater detail below, Kingsdown did not
hold that intent may be inferred from materiality. Kingsdown
explicitly notes that materiality and intent are distinct elements that
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 90 Nothing in the
opinion intimates that evidence of one element may be inferred based
on the existence of the other. On the contrary, the court seemingly
suggested the opposite, noting that since intent was not present "it is
unnecessary to discuss materiality."
9
'
82. Id.
83. Id. at 873.
84. Id. at 875.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 876 (en banc).
87. Id. (citing In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cit. 1986); Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731
F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 872.
91. Id. at 872 n.5 (citing Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1094
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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IIl. THE POST KINGSDOWN ERA
While Kingsdown remains the leading case for inequitable
conduct, some commentators and Federal Circuit judges maintain that
subsequent decisions have eroded "the lofty intent requirement for
inequitable conduct. ' ,92 As a result, they contend that intent and
materiality have been presumed "at levels far below the Kingsdown
rule," thus "reviv[ing] the inequitable conduct tactic. 93 This section
focuses on several cases since Kingsdown that have been criticized for
reverting to lower thresholds for inequitable conduct.
A. Critikon
1. Inferring Intent From Materiality
Critikon, Inc. v Becton Dickinson94 was one of the first post-
Kingsdown cases to generate controversy. In Critikon, the Federal
Circuit charged a plaintiff with inequitable conduct for failing to
disclose two pieces of information to the PTO in a patent
infringement suit. First, the patentee failed to disclose a prior art
patent during prosecution.95 Second, the plaintiff commenced reissue
proceedings after litigation had been initiated, but did not notify the
PTO that the patent was involved in litigation and that claims of
invalidity and inequitable conduct had been asserted against it. 96 The
district court failed to find the requisite intent to deceive the PTO and
held the patents enforceable.97 Upon review, however, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
98
Some commentators' objections to Critikon stem from the
court's statement that "intent may be inferred where a patent applicant
knew, or should have known, that withheld information would be
material to the PTO's consideration of the patent application." 99 At
the outset, it is important to note that the court relied on Driscoll v.
Cebalo, a case decided prior to Kingsdown, to support this
proposition. Several commentators have noted, however, that
92. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
95. Id. at 1255.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1259.
99. Id. at 1256 (citing Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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Kingsdown specifically overruled Driscoll on this precise issue. 100
Discussing several cases under the heading "Resolution of Conflicting
Precedent," the Kingsdown court cited Driscoll as "suggest[ing] that a
finding of gross negligence compels a finding of intent to deceive."'' 1
Yet in the very next paragraph, the en banc court rejected this
suggestion, finding that '"gross negligence' does not of itself justify
an inference of intent to deceive."' 0 2 Accordingly, some judges and
observers have urged that Critikon's proposition that intent may be
inferred where the applicant knew, or should have known of
materiality, is ultimately based on bad law. 0 3 This is important
because a number of subsequent cases draw support for this
proposition from either Critikon directly, or from other cases that rely
on Critikon.1°4
Aside from Critikon's reliance on Driscoll, language from other
Federal Circuit majority opinions suggest that this proposition
(inferred intent) does not conform to the requirements articulated in
Kingsdown.10 5 These cases emphasize that materiality and intent are
100. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (noting that this proposition from Critikon was supported solely by reference to
Driscoll, "a case that was overruled en banc by Kingsdown on this very point"). See also, Lynn
C. Tyler, Kingsdown Fifteen Years Later: What Does It Take to Prove Inequitable Conduct?, 13
FED. CIR. B.J. 267, 276 (2003-2004) (noting that, to the extent cases such as Critikon stand for
the proposition that intent may be inferred from materiality, "they are bad law because
ultimately they all rest on a decision that the Federal Circuit expressly overruled in
Kingsdown.").
101. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
102. Id.
103. Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1202 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Thus, this aspect of Critikon,
Inc. has been correctly identified by practitioners as 'bad law,' both because it relies on the
overruled Driscoll decision and because it is representative of a recent resurgence of the plague
that Kingsdown had intended to cure."). See also Tyler, supra note 100 at 276.
104. See, e.g., Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1191.
105. Indeed, a number of cases decided by various Federal Circuit panels have emphasized
that materiality and intent are distinct factors to be proven separately. See, e.g., Allen Eng'g
Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("'[M]ateriality does not presume
intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequitable conduct."' (quoting Allen
Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc. 839 F.2d 1556, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); Kao Corp. v. Unilever
U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that intent to deceive could not be
inferred from materiality, despite a "rather glaring failure of the inventors to offer any rationale
for the omission"); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365-66
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]t least a threshold level of each element-i.e., both materiality and intent to
deceive-must be proven by clear and convincing evidence" and "'materiality' does not presume
intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequitable conduct" (quoting GFI, Inc. v.
Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d
1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Materiality is not evidence of intent, which must be established as
a separate factual element"). Despite these cases, some judges on the Federal Circuit have
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separate factors that must be independently proven by clear and
convincing evidence. To be sure, since there is rarely direct evidence
of intent to deceive, the cases accepted that intent may be proven
from indirect evidence and the surrounding circumstances.1"6 But
commentators posit that inferring intent from circumstantial evidence
indicating deceitfulness is fundamentally different from inferring
intent based on a "should have known" standard of materiality.
10 7
While certain facts may be relevant to both inquiries, inferring intent
directly from materiality would appear to reduce the inequitable
conduct analysis to a single element test. 0 8 Further, other cases have
explicitly noted that indirect evidence used to infer intent must still be
clear and convincing and "inferences drawn from lesser evidence
cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement."' 0 9
Moreover, there is another argument suggesting that the notion
that intent can be inferred from materiality conflicts with Kingsdown.
In this case, the Kingsdown decision may be notable for what it did
not analyze. Specifically, the Kingsdown court did not reach the issue
of materiality, determining that such an inquiry was unnecessary in
light of its holding on intent. 10 But if the Kingsdown court
declared that other cases continue to incorrectly infer intent from materiality in violation of
Kingsdown. See Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(opining that the majority's finding of deceptive intent where an applicant knew or should have
known that omitted information was material was "directly contrary to Kingsdown" and "further
revives the 'plague' of the past, with burdens that far outweigh any conceivable benefits");
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (stating that by inferring intent, the majority cast the safeguards of Kingsdown aside
and "finds misrepresentation in correct science, infers malevolence from verb tense, and
grounds intent to deceive on personal slurs by a hostile witness"); Aventis Pharma S.A. v.
Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the judicial process has too often emphasized materiality almost to the exclusion of any
analysis of the lofty intent requirement" and, in so doing, has "[m]erg[ed] intent and materiality
at levels far below the Kingsdown rule").
106. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366 ("We have also held that because direct
evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred from indirect and
circumstantial evidence.").
107. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 17, at 3 ("While inferences may be drawn from
circumstantial evidence, an inference based on a should-have-known standard [of materiality]..
• is not an inference based on circumstantial evidence. It is an inference based on something
more nebulous and does not meet the scienter requirements of Kingsdown.").
108. Abbott, 544 F.3d at 1356 ("Materiality is not evidence of intent, which must be
established as a separate factual element").
109. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
110. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("Because of our decision on intent, it is unnecessary to discuss materiality"). See also
Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367 ("If a threshold level of intent to deceive or materiality is not
established by clear and convincing evidence, the district court does not have any discretion to
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contemplated that intent could be inferred from materiality, it would
seem that its analysis was incomplete. In that event, the court should
have addressed the materiality element to determine whether it rose to
a level sufficient to infer intent.11 The court's silence in this regard
thus seems to conflict with the proposition that intent could be
inferred from materiality.
Finally, the idea that intent may be inferred based on a "should
have known" standard has been criticized as invoking negligence
principles. 112 Kingsdown states that the accused conduct must be
sufficiently blameworthy to require a finding of deceitful intent and
holds that even gross negligence is not sufficient for an inequitable
conduct finding.113 Thus, while Kingsdown rejects the notion that
inequitable conduct can be based on mere negligence, Critikon's
inference of intent based on what a person "should have known" has
been criticized for injecting negligence principles into the analysis.
2. Balance and Burden
A separate question raised is whether Critikon balanced
materiality and intent prematurely. It is accepted that "[o]nce
thresholds of materiality and intent have been established, the court
conducts a balancing test and determines whether the scales tilt to a
conclusion that 'inequitable conduct' occurred."'1 4 The threshold
levels of each element, however, must still be established by clear and
convincing evidence prior to balancing; inferences drawn from lesser
evidence cannot satisfy these requirements.' 15 To establish a threshold
exercise and cannot hold the patent unenforceable regardless of the relative equities or how it
might balance them.").
111. Furthermore, had the court analyzed materiality according to Critikon, it is likely that
it would have risen to a sufficient level to infer intent. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar
Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (referring to
Kingsdown, Judge Rader notes that "it is hard to imagine a more material mistake than
reasserting claims to rejected subject matter").
112. David Hricik, Where The Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of Inequitable Conduct and
How to Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 295 (2004) ("The issue of whether a
person 'should have known' of the materiality of information obviously turns on negligence
principles."); Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow Construction for
Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and Drug Patent
Applications, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REv. 669, 697 (2003-2004) ("Gross negligence though,
which generally uses the "knew or should have known" standard, is not enough [to fimd intent to
deceive].... Thus, the standard of 'knew or should have known' is not the proper standard.").
113. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
114. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
115. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
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level of intent, clear and convincing evidence must prove that the
applicant had the specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO.' 
6
The court in Critikon noted the necessity of establishing
"thresholds of materiality and intent,"" 7 but it inferred intent based on
the materiality of the omission. Indeed, the court stated that "a
patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew
or should have known of that materiality can expect to find it
difficult... to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to
mislead."' 18 Nonetheless, if intent cannot be inferred from materiality,
as posited above, it follows that the threshold level of intent could not
have been established based on this inference. In that event, it would
be premature to balance the elements without analyzing independent
evidence of intent.
This also raises an additional question regarding the shift in the
burden of proof. The Critikon court stated that "a patentee facing a
high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have
known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish
'subjective good faith' sufficient to prevent the drawing of an
inference to mislead." '" 9 In essence, this appears to shift the burden to
the patentee to provide a good faith explanation once an accused
infringer has shown materiality. Again, however, if intent cannot be
inferred from materiality, the accused infringer would have only
proven one prong of the inequitable conduct test. In this event, it
would seem that the burden of proof was shifted to the patentee
before the accused infringer met its burden of proof. 20 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has noted elsewhere that
[t]he patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the
accused infringer first carried his burden to prove a threshold level
of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence. Only when
the accused infringer has met this burden is it incumbent upon the
patentee to rebut the evidence of deceptive intent with a good faith
explanation for the alleged misconduct.121
116. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
117. Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1256.
118. Id at 1257.
119. Id.
120. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1368 ("[The accused infringer] cannot carry its burden
simply because [the patentee] failed to prove a credible alternative explanation.").
121. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Thus, Critikon's holding not only raises questions regarding whether
intent may be inferred from materiality, but it also raises questions
regarding equitable balancing and the burden of proof.
B. Novo Nordisk
Some commentators opine that the court in Novo Nordisk
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bio-Technology General Corp.'22 expanded
the "should have known" standard even further. In this case, the
controversy centered on an example in a patent application, filed by
Danish inventors that were directed to a process for producing human
growth hormone (hGH). 123 The example described the production,
purification, and evaluation of a fusion protein 124 as well as the
treatment of fusion proteins with an enzyme to produce ripe hGH.1
2 5
Nonetheless, while the final step of the example was written in past
tense, the inventors had not actually prepared hGH according to the
example at the time the application was filed. 26 This was clearly not
in compliance with PTO regulations, which, while allowing paper or
prophetic examples, require them to be written in present tense.1
27
Notably, the district court acknowledged that during prosecution the
inventor was not aware of this requirement and thus "did not
intentionally breach his duty of candor and good faith."' 128 Further,
though the patent attorney would have been aware of this
requirement, there was no evidence that the patent attorney
discovered that the inventor had not actually performed the final step.
Despite these facts, the district court found inequitable conduct,
122. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc., v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp, 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
123. Id. at 1349.
124. Id. at 1357.
125. Id.
126. Id. For instance, the example stated that "[tihe fusion product was purified from this
extract," that "[tihe purified fusion protein was evaluated to be more than 98% pure," and that
"[tIhis ... product was then treated with leucine aminopeptidase." Id.
127. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2004 (8th ed., rev. 7 2008) ("Paper or prophetic examples should not be
described using the past tense.").
128. Novo Nordisk, 424 F.3d at 1361 n.12. The appellate court further elaborated that "the
[district] court concluded 'that Mr. Christensen's use of past tense was merely an over:ight on
his part, likely due to the fact that Dr. Christensen is trained as a scientist, not as a patent
attorney familiar with the teachings of the MPEP." Id. See also Hanft & Kerns, supra note 17 at
2 ("The district court acknowledged that the Danish inventor did not know that verb tense could
change the meaning of an example during patent prosecution and found no intent to deceive
based on this mistake at the time of filing.").
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holding that knowledge of the law, or in this case an MPEP provision,
was chargeable to the inventor.
129
The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of inequitable conduct.
Specifically, it agreed that "'knowledge of the law is chargeable to the
inventor,' and 'inventors represented by counsel are presumed to
know the law."",130  Since the inventor knew the example was
prophetic, and since the court charged him with knowledge of the
MPEP, the court found that he "knew or should have known" that the
verb tense was material.131 As a result, the court found that the
inventor had deceitful intent. 132 The court dismissed the plaintiffs
defense, stating:
Novo asks us to hold, on the one hand, that the failure of Dr.
Christensen and his co-inventors to disclose the truth about
Example 1 to Novo's attorneys absolves them of their duty to
disclose this information to the PTO or the Board, because without
their attorney's consultation, they could not have known that this
information was material. At the same time, Novo asks us to hold
that its counsel's failure to disclose the truth about Example I to
the PTO or Board is excused because the inventors failed to fully
inform them of the details surrounding Example 1. As we have
done in similar situations in the past, we reject the "circular logic"
of this request.' 
33
The imputation of knowledge from one party to another has been
the target of controversy. 34  As other decisions have noted, a
129. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 17 at 3.
130. Novo Nordisk, 424 F.3d at 1361. Both the defendant and the court based this
proposition on the statement in Brasseler, U.S.A. ., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370,
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001), that "knowledge of the law is chargeable to the inventor." Brasseler, in
turn, relied on two prior cases for this proposition. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1987). However, one commentator has noted:
Neither Molins nor FMC Corp. support the proposition that knowledge of the law
is chargeable to applicants in order to determine whether an applicant knew of
the materiality of the information. Instead, what each holds is that if a person
substantively involved in prosecution of an application commits inequitable
conduct, that person 's misconduct is chargeable to the applicant, and thus the
applicant's patent is unenforceable. The Brasseler court's imputation of
information from one person to another is, I believe, unprecedented in inequitable
conduct law.
Hricik, supra note 112 at 295 n.39 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
131. NovoNordisk, 424 F.3d at 1361.
132. Id. at 1362.
133. Id. at 1361-62.
134. See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 17, at I ("A disturbing trend has emerged in recent
inequitable conduct decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. When viewed
2009] INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER KINGSDOWN 857
defendant must prove that an applicant had "the specific intent to...
mislead[] or deceiv[e] the PTO."'135 But commentators reason that "[a]
person cannot form a specific intent to deceive without having actual
knowledge of the materiality of information or at least by
intentionally avoiding learning about material information after being
put on notice.' 36 Thus, the defendant's argument can reasonably be
viewed as involving two concepts. First, inventors cannot have a
specific intent to deceive if they do not know that something, such as
verb tense, is critical. Second, patent attorneys cannot have the
specific intent to deceive, absent knowledge that the inventors did not
actually perform a step in an example. While miscommunication
between an attorney and inventor should not be encouraged, it is
difficult to characterize it as constituting a specific intent to deceive.
Consequently, commentators from a firm that represented Novo
during its appeal portrayed the decision in the following manner:
What the Federal Circuit did was to charge knowledge of the law
(or in this case, a specific provision of the MPEP about the effect
of tenses in the English language in a biotechnology patent) from
the attorney to the inventor, infer that the applicant "should have
known" about the materiality of the information, and then infer
deceptive intent from that presumed knowledge, in total disregard
for the district court finding that the inventor had acted innocently
10 years earlier in drafting the application.
137
These commentators have characterized the court's so-called "double
inference" as "disturbing."' 138 Further, they contend that such
inferences do not meet the requirements of Kingsdown.139 Indeed, it is
difficult to reconcile the notions that an inventor who committed an
"oversight" and who "did not intentionally breach his duty of candor"
nevertheless had the specific intent to deceive the PTO. Based on the
holding in Novo, these commentators have argued that the inventor
over a period of decades, the pendulum swings back and forth regarding the ease with which a
finding can be made of inequitable conduct."). See also Hricik, supra note 112 at 295 (opining
that the Federal Circuit in Brasseler "applied an even more unusual gloss on this issue when it
applied what amounts to an almost strict liability standard" by imputing knowledge of what
constituted a sale under patent law to inventors). Indeed, "[t]he Brasseler court's imputation of
information from one person to another is, I believe, unprecedented in inequitable conduct law."
Id. n.39 (emphasis added).
135. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1181.
136. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 17 at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
858 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
and patent attorney must be virtual "mind-readers" throughout
prosecution.
140
In sum, the proposition that knowledge can be imputed to the
inventor has been criticized as moving away from Kingdown's
requirements toward a strict liability standard.141 Further,
commentators have criticized this shift as imposing harsh
requirements on both inventors and patent attorneys. 142 In light of the
intricacies of patent law and practice, inferring intent by imputing
knowledge of materiality may indeed be fraught with hazard and
uncertainty.
C. Ferring
In Ferring B.V v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 143 the court
considered a case involving the submission of declarations to the PTO
during patent prosecution. The inventors, who had assigned all their
rights to their employer Ferring, claimed a medicinal peptide
compound and a method of administering the compound whereby it
was absorbed in the gastrointestinal tract.' 44 Initially, the examiners
were concerned that a prior art reference ('491 patent) discussing the
peroral application of a peptide anticipated the invention. 145 The
inventors disagreed that the peroral application in the '491 patent
anticipated the invention, so the patent examiners suggested that the
inventors submit non-inventor affidavits to support their interpretation
of the term "peroral."'146 The inventors complied, submitting two
declarations from non-inventors opining that the peroral application
of a peptide, as disclosed in the '491 patent, did not anticipate the
patentee's invention. 147 Nevertheless, the examiners rejected the
claims as anticipated or obvious in light of the '491 patent.' 48 After
appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) found
that the invention was not anticipated by the '491 patent, but was
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
144. Id. at 1183.
145. Id. at 1183 (stating the examiners were concerned that the use of the term "peroral" in
the prior art reference encompassed oral administration of a peptide for gastrointestinal
absorption).
146. Id. at 1183-84.
147. Id. at 1184. The affidavits relayed the writer's belief that the term "peroral" in the
prior art reference meant that the compound could be administered orally, but could only be
absorbed through the cheek or under the tongue rather than through the gastrointestinal tract. Id.
148. Id. at l184.
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rendered obvious by the '491 patent in light of another reference. 149
To overcome this rejection, the inventors submitted four additional
declarations from non-inventors, explaining why the invention was
not obvious in light of the cited art.
150
The key issue centered on the fact that the inventors failed to
disclose that several of the affidavits were written by scientists that
had either been previously employed by Ferring or that received
funding from Ferring. 15 1 Notably, the court found that the inventors
only knew of prior relationships between Ferring and two of the four
affiants. 152 Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on inequitable conduct based on the
omissions of these prior relationships. 1
53
As an initial matter, it is important to note that there was no
evidence that any of the affiants presented a false opinion in their
affidavits, that the affidavits deceived the examiner, or that the
affiants provided misinformation.' 54 Thus, the analysis did not focus
on the materiality or accuracy of the scientific information itself, but
rather on the materiality of the affiants' relationship to the inventor. 155
Noting that materiality does not presume intent, the majority went on
to state that "in the absence of a credible explanation, intent to
deceive is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding a knowing failure to disclose material information."'
' 56
Referencing earlier cases, the court stated that summary judgment is
appropriate on the issue of intent where an applicant fails to supply
highly material information and
1. the applicant knew of the information;
2.the applicant knew or should have known of the materiality of
the information; and
149. id.
150. Id. at 1185. One of the inventors also submitted a declaration.
151. Id. at 1186.
152. While three of the scientist had a prior relationship, it was unclear whether the
inventor was aware of the relationship between Ferring and the third affiant. Id. at 1191 & n.12.
Note, however, that the dissent states that the evidence only showed that the inventor knew of
one of these affiliations. Id. at 1198 (Newman, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent declared that
the majority's description of "intimate ties" between the affiants and inventor was a
"mischaracterization" and described the inference of bias as a "travesty." Id
153. Id. at 1186.
154. Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1191 (majority opinion) (quoting Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn
Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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3.the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for his
withholding.
57
Addressing the facts of the case, the court first concluded that the
undisclosed information was highly material.158 Moving to intent, the
court analyzed the three factors enumerated above. The court
concluded that the inventor knew of past relationships between two of
the affiants and Ferring, thus satisfying the first prong of the test.1 59
Next, the court concluded that the examiner's request for "non-
inventor" affidavits put the inventor on notice that "disinterested
affidavits" were necessary, and thus the inventor should have known
that the past relationships were material. 60  Finally, the court
concluded that the patentee's various explanations for the omission
were inadequate.16 1 Based on these findings, the court found the
omission of the relationships sufficient to infer intent to deceive the
PTO.
157. Id. (citing Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1354; Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
158. Id. at 1190.
159. Id. at 1191. There appears to be a discrepancy between the majority and dissent
regarding the number of affiant relationships the inventor was aware of. While the majority
states that the inventor knew of past relationships between Ferring and two of the inventors, the
dissent states that the inventor knew of only one such affiliation. Id. at 1198 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
160. Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1192. To support this proposition, the majority cited Refac Int'l
Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But the dissent opined that
this case did "not support the sweeping inference now applied." Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1199.
Indeed, the dissent distinguished Refac based on the fact that the declarant in that case had been
an employee of the inventor's company, he 'had worked with and reviewed documentation for
the commercial embodiment of the invention,"' and he "'recognized the flow chart [of the
computer program invention] as being essentially the same one' shown to him during training.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, "the relevant omitted material information [concerned] the
declarant's prior experience with the invention." Id.
161. The court characterized the crux of appellants' explanation as essentially arguing
"that there are possible benign explanations for the withholding and that evidence might have
been developed at trial to support those theories." Id. at 1192. The court rejected this argument,
noting that on summary judgment appellants bore the burden of submitting an affidavit to
contradict the movant's evidence of intent. Id. Thus, appellants could not create a genuine issue
by suggesting that they "might have proffered favorable evidence at trial." Id.
In addition, appellants offered several specific arguments to explain the omission.
First, they argued that the inventor who obtained the affidavits, "as a foreign scientist, was not
familiar with patent prosecution, and therefore would not have known of 'some obligation to
disclose declarants' associations with Ferring."' Id. The court rejected this argument, asserting
that there was no evidence to support the inventor's lack of knowledge. Id. Further, appellants
argued that "'there was no reason for Dr. Vilhardt [the inventor], a foreigner and non-lawyer, to
have understood the examiner to be requesting declarations from persons with no relationship to
Ferring."' Id. at 1193. Again, the court declared that appellants "offered nothing to support such
an inference." Id. In sum, the court concluded that appellants' "argument concerning credible
explanations consists entirely of speculation." Id.
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The Ferring ruling is notable because there was no suggestion
that the examiner would have weighed the declarations differently.'
62
Indeed, the majority noted that there was nothing inherently wrong
with these types of declarations at all. 63 The majority recognized that
it may be "completely natural for the inventor to recommend, and
even contact, his own colleagues ... and to submit declarations from
such people."'164 Further, "[n]othing in this opinion should be read as
discouraging such practice.' 65 Nevertheless, the majority found that
the relationships were material, inferring intent to mislead the PTO
based on their omission.
In dissent, Judge Newman asserted that the defendant presented
no evidence of deceptive intent. 166 Judge Newman charged that the
majority "infers material misrepresentation, infers malevolent intent,
and presumes inequitable conduct.., on the theory that the inventor
'should have known' that something might be deemed material.' 67
She contended that the majority, "steeped in adverse inferences, holds
that good faith is irrelevant and presumes bad faith."'' 68 While
acknowledging that dishonest persons rarely confess to wrongdoing,
she declared that "the court goes too far in establishing such deceptive
intent as a matter of law based on inference as to what an inventor
'should have known."",16 9 Thus, she alleged that the panel majority
"not only ignore[d] Kingsdown and restore[d] a casually subjective
standard, they also impose a positive inference of wrongdoing,
replacing the need for evidence with a 'should have known'
standard."1
70
Judge Newman also noted the impropriety, in her opinion, of
making such an inference on summary judgment. 171 She characterized
the majority's assertion that Ferring offered no evidence to support its
position as "untenable."'' 72 Instead, the evidence seemed susceptible to
162. Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting). In fact, an examiner later dismissed the
requested declarations defining the term "peroral," finding that they were unnecessary. Id. at
1197 n.2.
163. Id. at 1194-95.
164. Id. at 1195.
165. Id.
166. Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1201 (Newman, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1196.
168. Id. at1197.
169. Id. at 1201.
170. Id. at 1196.
171. Id. at 1204.
172. Id. at 1205.
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different interpretations. 173 In light of these issues, Judge Newman felt
it was inappropriate to decide the issue on summary judgment:
At a minimum, the issue should be remanded, on correct law. It is
not the law that a declarant's past affiliations are always material,
and it surely is not the law that "should have known" establishes
deceptive intent, which requires scienter and deliberateness. On its
face, "the involved conduct viewed in light of all the evidence,"
does not "indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of
intent to deceive," the standard of Kingsdown. It is improper to
convict this inventor of fraudulent conduct based on inference, on
summary judgment. That is not the law, and it is not a just
procedure.'
74
Thus, in holding that deceptive intent may be established as a matter
of law where an applicant should have know that information was
material, Judge Newman charged that the majority "further revives
the 'plague' of the past, with burdens that far outweigh any
conceivable benefits."'
175
In the end, this outcome illustrates the different views of the
inequitable conduct test within the Federal Circuit. It also exemplifies
the controversy in inferring intent based on a "should have known"
standard of materiality. In this case, the inventor strictly complied
with the requirement for non-inventor affidavits. Further, there is
merit in the contention that a request for non-inventor affidavits is not
the same as a request for disinterested affidavits. Thus, without more,
it is difficult to construe this omission as containing the requisite
scienter for a finding of specific intent to deceive the PTO,
particularly on summary judgment.
173. For instance, in this case the examiner asked for declarations from a "non-inventor."
Id. at 1184. The inventor strictly complied with this request, as none of the four remaining
affiants were inventors. Id. at 1197 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman distinguished this
from the case of Paragon Podiatry, relied on by the majority, where the examiner asked for
declarations from a "disinterested third party." Id. at 1199. Further, in Paragon Podiatry the
affiants, who were former consultants that owned stock in the assignee's company, engaged in
deceptive behavior by telling a "half-truth" in their declarations. Specifically, their declarations
contained "the carefully worded statement that they were not 'in the past employed by nor do I
intend in the future to be employed by' the patentee." Id. (citing Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v.
KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
174. Id. at 1205 (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 1203.
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D. Dippin'Dots
Another recent case in the inequitable conduct arena is Dippin'
Dots, Inc. v. Mosey.' 76 In this case, Dippin' Dots (DDI) was the
exclusive licensee of a patent directed to a method for making ice-
cream. 177  DDI brought an infringement suit against former
distributors that entered into competition against it.' 78 In defense, the
distributors claimed inequitable conduct based on the inventor's
failure to disclose to the PTO a sale of the ice cream made more than
one year prior to its application date. 79 Specifically, the inventor had
sold samples of the product at a market over the course of several
days to obtain "test-marketing information."' 80 The inventor claimed
that he only practiced the first three steps of the method and that the
method, as practiced at the market, could not be commercially
exploited.' 8' Considering the sales to fall within the experimental use
exception to 35 U.S.C. 102(b), the patent attorney did not disclose
them to the PTO. 82 Nevertheless, the district court found that this
omission constituted inequitable conduct and the Federal Circuit
affirmed.
The concern in the Dippin' Dots case lies in the court's rather
broad statements regarding the type of evidence sufficient to satisfy
the intent element. At the outset, the court declared that "' [s]moking
gun' evidence is not required in order to establish an intent to
deceive.... Rather, this element of inequitable conduct[] must
generally be inferred from the facts and circumstances."' 183 Analyzing
the particular facts of the case, the court acknowledged that "a finding
of intent may not be particularly strong here."'' 84 Indeed, the Federal
Circuit rejected the district court's characterization that the intent to
176. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 1340.
178. Id. at 1341.
179. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), an inventor shall be entitled to a patent unless the
invention was "in public use or on sale in the country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). There is a limited
experimental use exception to section 102(b) whereby the inventor may use the invention for
certain experimental purposes more than one year prior to filing an application. See generally
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHi L. REV. 1017 (1989).
180. Dippin'Dots, 476 F.3d. at 1340.
181. Id. at 1341.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1345 (alterations in original) (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM
Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
184. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
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deceive was "of a high nature," concluding instead that "the evidence
reveals less than an egregiously willful intent to deceive."1
85
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit declared that "the district court was
permitted to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent." 186
A troubling aspect of these statements is their seemingly
expansive reach and potential for broad interpretation. To be sure, the
court acknowledged that an applicant must establish threshold levels
of materiality and intent.1 87 But it is unclear how a threshold level of
intent, requiring clear and convincing evidence, can be established by
"relatively weak evidence." The opinion offers no guidance to suggest
how parties may reconcile these apparently different levels of
evidence. Without more, there is a risk that litigants may point to this
decision in an effort to lower the threshold for intent as a practical
matter.
This case raises additional questions regarding the accused
infringer's showing of intent. Rejecting a Walker Process antitrust
claim 88 for insufficient proof of intent, the court recognized that an
omission such as this "could happen for any number of nonfraudulent
reasons-the applicant could have had a good-faith belief that
disclosure was not necessary, or simply have forgotten to make the
required disclosure."' 89 Further, the court noted that "the defendants
submitted no evidence of their own-aside from the absence of the
Festival market sales from the prosecution record-which
affirmatively shows DDI's fraudulent intent." 190 Addressing the intent
element, the court noted that for a Walker Process antitrust claim,
"there must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the
omission."' 9 l
185. Id. at 1346 n.4.
186. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 1345-46.
188. Typically, a patentee is immune from antitrust liability for asserting its exclusive
rights to a patent. But "[p]roof that a patentee has 'obtained the patent by knowingly and
willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office ... [is] sufficient to strip [the patentee] of its
exemption from the antitrust laws."' Id. (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). A party asserting this type of fraudulently obtained
patent may expose itself to a Walker Process antitrust claim. Dippin' Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346. In
order to prevail on a Walker Process claim, the claimant must demonstrate that the patent owner
obtained the patent through either a fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission,
evidencing a clear intent to deceive the patent examiner and cause the PTO to grant an invalid
patent, and that the patentee was aware of the fraud when bringing suit to enforce the patent.
JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 375-77 (2d ed. 2006).
189. Dippin 'Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347.
190. Id. at 1348.
191. Id. at 1347.
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Taken together, these statements seem to suggest that the intent
element for inequitable conduct was inferred solely from the omission
itself. But Federal Circuit precedent establishes that to prove intent
for inequitable conduct "the alleged conduct must not amount merely
to the improper performance of, or omission of, an act one ought to
have performed. Rather, clear and convincing evidence must prove
that an applicant had the specific intent to ... mislead[] or deceiv[e]
the PTO."'1 92 Thus, this discussion in the Walker Process antitrust
analysis is confusing. If intent cannot be inferred solely from an
applicant's omission, how was the defendant here able to prove such
intent when they submitted no evidence aside from the omission of
the sales information?
The end result of this case naturally raises the following
questions. First, how may clear and convincing evidence of deceitful
intent be established by relatively weak evidence of intent? 193 Second,
if the defendants "submitted no evidence of their own... which
affirmatively show[ed] DDI's fraudulent intent," 94 and if the
omission could have occurred "for any number of nonfraudulent
reasons,"' 95 how could the defendant nonetheless have proven that the
applicant had the specific intent to deceive the PTO?' 96 These
statements seem to open the door to potentially expansive
interpretation beyond the bounds of Kingsdown.
E. Aventis
The recent case of Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,'197 also generated controversy on the metes and
bounds of the intent element. This case centered on the disclosure of
test data during patent prosecution for a pharmaceutical compound.
198
The examiner initially rejected the claims for the compound, finding
them both anticipated and obvious over several references, including
192. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
193. See Dippin'Dots, 476 F.3d. at 1346.
194. Id. at 1348.
195. Id. at 1347.
196. "[E]vidence must still be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser
evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement." Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In addition, "the inference must not only be
based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light of that evidence, but must also be the
single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and
convincing standard." Id. (emphasis added).
197. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
authors' firm represented the plaintiffs-appellants in this case.
198. Id. at 1341.
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European Patent 40,144 (EP '144).199 In response, the applicant
amended claim one and submitted a declaration from a non-inventor
(Dr. Uzan), distinguishing the claimed compound from the EP '144
formulations based on a half-life comparison.200 In the declaration,
Dr. Uzan noted that the half-life data "represents an increase in 250%
in the half life and is very significant because it enables the same
effect to be achieved with lower dosages."
201
Despite this declaration, the patent examiner issued another
Office Action rejecting the claims.2 °2 Responding to this Office
Action, Dr. Uzan submitted a second declaration referencing data
from a half-life comparison between the claimed compound and the
EP '144 compound.20 3 The data was contained in five tables that were
attached to the declaration.204 The half life data for the claimed
compound was listed in one set of tables, while the half life data of
the EP '144 compound was listed in a separate set of tables. 205 Dr.
Uzan included a statistical analysis demonstrating that the differences
in half life between the claimed compound and the EP '144
compound were statistically significant. 20 6 However, while the tables
for the claimed compound listed the dosage, the tables for the EP '144
compound did not.207 The allegation of inequitable conduct arose
from the fact that, while the EP '144 compound was tested at a
different dosage than the claimed compound, the difference was not
explicitly noted in the tables.2°8
Addressing the intent element, the majority noted that "'the
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including
evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability
to require a finding of intent to deceive.' 20 9 It is notable, however,
that the majority did not reiterate that intent must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.2t ° Instead, after affirming that the court
199. Id. at 1338.
200. Id. at 1339.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 1339-40.
203. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1340.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1340 n.5.
206. Id. at 1340.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1341.
209. Id. at 1343 (quoting Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
210. The court states only that "[g]iven that direct evidence is often unavailable, intent is
generally inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances." Id. at 1344.
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shall balance the equities "upon finding materiality and intent," the
majority then stated the balancing test.21' The court declared that
"[t]he more material the omission or misrepresentation, the less intent
that must be shown to elicit a finding of inequitable conduct., 21 2 The
court ultimately ruled that the omission was made with deceitful
intent and constituted inequitable conduct.2 13
There are several troubling aspects about the finding of deceitful
intent. For example, in a prior appeal of this case, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged the possibility that Dr. Uzan "may have intended" that
his statement in the first declaration would convey that the half life
comparisons were done at different doses.214 Thus, it remanded the
case to the district court to consider the intent element. The district
court ultimately ruled that the omission was made with intent to
deceive and the majority affirmed. The Federal Circuit stated that the
district court heard Dr. Uzan's testimony regarding intent, but that
this "did not outweigh" other evidence evincing an intent to
deceive. 1 5 But whether evidence of deceitful intent "outweighs" other
evidence suggests a preponderance of the evidence standard.2 16 In
contrast, deceitful intent must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Further, to satisfy the clear and convincing requirement,
intent may only be inferred from circumstantial evidence where it is
"the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
evidence."
217
Another troubling aspect of this case is its reference to
submitting information in a "misleading way." Noting that half life
211. Id.
212. id.
213. Id. at 1349.
214. Id. at 1348. The court noted that an earlier decision "left open the possibility" that Dr.
Uzan's statement that "this represents an increase in 250% in the half life and is very significant
because it enables the same effect to be achieved with lower dosages," may have been intended
to convey that the half-life comparisons were done at different dosages. Id. However, this
characterization seems to ignore the full import of Dr. Uzan's statement. Here, Dr. Uzan
specifically noted that his comparison showed that the same effect was "achieved at lower
dosages." Furthermore, his statement explicitly drew attention to this result as "very
significant." In contrast to the court's characterization, it is difficult to understand how Dr. Uzan
could have possibly intended to convey anything other than the fact that the half-life comparison
was performed at different dosages.
215. Id.-
216. Preponderance of the evidence is defined as the "[t]he greater weight of the
evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 2004). In contrast, clear and convincing
evidence establishes a greater burden and is "[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is
highly probable or reasonably certain." Id. at 596.
217. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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data for the patented compound at two doses was presented in an
example in the patent, the court stated that "[e]ven if we acknowledge
that half-life data at other doses for the patent compound were
provided to the examiner, the data were provided in a very misleading
way. , 18 However, whether a submission is made in a misleading way
seems to inject a subjective element into the inequitable conduct
analysis. But Kingsdown was intended to establish objective standards
for the inequitable conduct analysis. 219 Further, the majority does not
enunciate any standards for evaluating whether a submission is
sufficiently misleading to constitute inequitable conduct. Thus, this
statement provides litigants the opportunity to argue that, even if
information was presented, it was presented in a misleading way and
satisfies the intent element. This creates further potential for
expanding the inequitable conduct doctrine based on subjective
standards rather than objective criteria.
In light of these and other issues, Judge Rader's dissent
suggested that the court occasionally revisit its Kingsdown opinion.22°
Judge Rader opined that Kingsdown was intended to make inequitable
conduct a rare occurrence.221 It "restricts a finding of inequitable
conduct to only the most extreme cases of fraud and deception.,
222
Moreover, Kingsdown required substantially more than materiality.
Indeed, Judge Rader thought it "hard to imagine" a more material
mistake than that which occurred in Kingsdown.223 Yet in that case,
the court failed to find inequitable conduct because there was no
evidence of deceptive intent. However, Judge Rader observed that
since Kingsdown, "the judicial process has too often emphasized
materiality almost to the exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent
requirement for inequitable conduct. 2 24 Instead, "[m]erging intent
218. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The court relied on Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1191 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), for this proposition. However, as noted supra note 173, the facts in Paragon were far
more egregious.
219. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Kingsdown "undertook to bring objective standards ... to the charge of
inequitable conduct" and decrying the reinstatement of a "casually subjective standard" in the
inequitable conduct analysis).
220. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1349.
223. Id. at 1350.
224. Id. Compare the "lofty intent requirement" mandated by Kingsdown and espoused by
Judge Rader with Critikon 's proposition that intent may be inferred where the patentee "should
have known" information was material.
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and materiality at levels far below the Kingsdown rule has revived the
inequitable conduct tactic. ' 2 5
Addressing the specific facts of the case, the dissent found it
relevant that "Dr. Uzan did not attempt to conceal data that were
otherwise present." 226 Instead, he submitted data without adding
further to the disclosure. 27 Thus, "[t]his omission, even if negligent,
is hardly Kingsdown's culpable intent to deceive. 2 28 Further, the
dissent noted Dr. Uzan's testimony that the "different dose 'did not
come to his mind.', 229 The dissent found merit in this explanation,
noting that "[c]omparison of drug properties at their clinically
relevant (and different) dosages is, of course, completely
appropriate., 230 Finally, the dissent noted that dosages were listed in
several subsections, but were conspicuously absent from one of the
subsections. 231 As a result, "the absence of a dosage in subsection 3 is
blatantly obvious. Surely if Dr. Uzan had intended to deceive the
USPTO, he would not have made this omission so conspicuous" 232 In
sum, the dissent did not find clear and convincing evidence that the
omission was made with intent to deceive.23 3
Again, Aventis Pharma raises significant questions about the
inequitable conduct doctrine and the precise contours of the intent
element. Like other cases, it illustrates differences within courts
considering the inequitable conduct defense. It also demonstrates that
what may appear to be an innocent oversight might nevertheless be
construed as inequitable conduct. Unfortunately, this creates the
potential for further uncertainty in the inequitable conduct analysis.
F. Summary
While the cases discussed in this section are not exhaustive, they
represent some of the controversial decisions on inequitable conduct.
Based on these cases, what can be learned about the intent element as
analyzed by different Federal Circuit panels? Below is a short
summary of the more salient points.
225. Id.
226. AventisPharma, 525 F.3d at 1351.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1352.
232. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1352.
233. Id. at 1349.
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* Panels have inferred intent to deceive based on the
materiality of an act or omission, finding deceitful intent
where an applicant "should have known" the act or omission
was material.2 34
* Panels have imputed knowledge of United States patent
regulations from an attorney to an applicant and, based on
this imputed knowledge, found that the applicant "should
have known" that information was material.235
* Panels have drawn negative inferences of deceitful intent
where an applicant cannot give a reasonable explanation for
236an act or omission.
" Panels have required an applicant to provide a good faith
explanation for an act or omission after an accused infringer
has shown that it was material and that the applicant should
have known it was material.2 37
* Panels have affirmed a finding of deceitful intent based on
admittedly "weak evidence."
238
IV. THE DANGERS OF A LOW INTENT THRESHOLD
Patentees are understandably concerned about the inequitable
conduct doctrine and they have a substantial interest in ensuring that
is not applied lightly. To procure a patent, an applicant must expend
substantial resources, including both time and money. Patents may
also represent a significant source of a company's value or revenue
base. Thus, there are a number of reasons why it is essential to strictly
apply the requirements for inequitable conduct.
First, the heightened requirements are essential because the
penalty for inequitable conduct is severe.239 In short, inequitable
conduct renders the entire patent unenforceable even where every
claim clearly meets the requirement of patentability. 240 Thus, some
234. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
235. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc., v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1361-62 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
236. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
237. Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1259.
238. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
239. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008). Indeed, Judge Rader has likened it to an "'atomic bomb' remedy." Aventis Pharma S.A.
v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
240. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. This is quite different from invalidity, which only
impacts claims. See MUELLER, supra note 188, at 348. Thus, even where one claim is deemed
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courts have recognized that "[j]ust as it is inequitable to permit a
patentee who obtained his patent by deliberate misrepresentation...,
it is also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee
only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability.
241
Lower thresholds increase the potential for an innocent party to have
their patent rights entirely destroyed by a weak inequitable conduct
charge. In some cases, this may nullify years of research and billions
of dollars in investment and revenue. Due to the harshness of this
remedy, it remains incumbent on the accused infringer to prove an
elevated level of intent.
242
Another danger in lowering the threshold is the relative ease with
which a party can misconstrue a patentee's actions or omissions after
the fact. Armed with 20-20 hindsight and benefiting from the passage
of time and fading memories, litigants may read a host of improper
intentions into an innocent act or omission.2 43 The problem is that in
the realm of research and development, researchers and patentees can
make innocent mistakes. Researchers, under pressure to complete
multiple projects, may accidently forget to record a piece of
information or may inadvertently forget to label a data table.
Patentees and attorneys may unintentionally forget a piece of
information, may believe that the information is not material, or may
simply not understand its relevance. While such actions may be
understandable at the time they occur, it is far easier to read a sinister
motive into these actions years after the fact when the particular
details of the events have faded from memory. 2 "
The inequitable conduct doctrine also gives accused infringers a
powerful incentive to overstate the significance of every act or
invalid, the remaining claims may remain valid and may still be asserted in an infringement suit.
Id.
241. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
242. Id.
243. The Federal Circuit has recognized this danger, noting in one case that "[t]he trial
court, after the controversy had arisen, and with the '20-20 vision of hindsight,' read the patent
entirely differently than did those concerned with its issue." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco
Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The trial court found inequitable conduct from the
patentees' inconsistent use of a term in the claims. Id. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit declared
that "[r]ather than anyone being a crook, it is surely a permissible inference that both the
applicant's attorney and the examiner were alike confused, not being possessed of the analytical
vision of hindsight." Id. at 1421. As a result, the Federal Circuit overruled the district court's
finding of inequitable conduct. Id. at 1422.
244. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has noted "the ease with which a relatively routine act of
patent prosecution can be portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive." N. Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Thus "[a] patentee's oversights are easily
magnified out of proportion by one accused of infringement." Id.
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omission, however small, for a huge payoff. A successful allegation
of inequitable conduct allows an accused infringer to continue its
course of conduct without showing non-infringement or invalidity of
the patent.245 Thus, the infringer may view "every experiment done
and not done, every scientific inference, every judgment or belief, [as]
fair game for opportunistic attack., 246 Under this lens, it is extremely
rare that "some flaw cannot be found., 247 Indeed, "[t]he uncertainties
of the processes of scientific research, the vagaries of the inductive
method, the complexities of patent procedures, and the twists of
hindsight, all provide[] grist for this pernicious mill. '248 As a result,
"[a] litigant need only scour the prosecution history of the asserted
patent to find any violation of the MPEP to trump up charges of
inequitable conduct.
249
At the same time, such allegations may ignore the principle that
"[i]ntent to deceive should be determined in light of the realities of
patent practice. 25 ° Some commentators have noted that recent trends
in inequitable conduct fail to take into account "the commonsense
realization that most inventors are not trained in law or patent
prosecution, and many are foreign scientists whose first language is
not English., 251 Further:
[T]his trend fails to recognize that prosecuting attorneys generally
do not monitor the day-to-day activities of their clients, are not
likely to know about the results of experiments, and are unaware of
the affiliations of scientists used to support patentability. It also
fails to recognize that the time spent on a particular patent
application is finite and that not every omission of information is
the result of a deliberate decision that is required to find an intent
to deceive.
252
Thus, the bar should be set high to mitigate "the ease with which
ordinary actions in scientific research or patent prosecution can be
distorted by zealous attack., 253  Without such requirements,
245. See MUELLER, supra note 188, at 348.
246. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
247. Id. One commentator has noted that "infringers are so quick to accuse patent
prosecutors or inventors of inequitable conduct that it seems that any action or inaction
undertaken can be grounds for inequitable conduct charges." Upadhye, supra note 112, at 696.
248. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372.
249. Hanfi & Kerns, supra note 17, at 5.
250. N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
251. Hanfi & Kerns, supra note 17, at 5.
252. Id. at 5.
253. Hoffmnann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372.
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commentators opine that "[p]roving inequitable conduct will simply
be a matter of finding that someone should have known something;
after that, a court can infer the intent to deceive the [USPTO]." 54
Lowered requirements also place a heavy burden on patentees by
requiring them to explain an event that occurred long in the past that
may have faded from memory. According to some opinions, a
negative inference of intent may be found if the applicant cannot give
a credible explanation for withholding information. 255 This may prove
extremely difficult when the questioned actions occurred years
earlier. Therefore, a good faith explanation should not be required
until the accused infringer has proven both elements of the defense.
To draw a negative inference of intent based on a patentee's lack of a
reasonable explanation, before the challenger has actually proven
specific intent to deceive, is unfair to the patentee.
A final danger, while perhaps less obvious than those
enumerated above, should nevertheless be of concern to patent
practitioners. Simply put, an increase in inequitable conduct charges
casts a pall of suspicion around the parties involved in patent
prosecution. Some judges have noted that, prior to Kingsdown, the
onslaught of inequitable conduct charges caused courts to "suspect
that all scientists [were] knaves and all patent attorneys [were]
jackals. 2 56 Indeed, "judges came to believe that every inventor and
every patent attorney wallowed in sharp practice. 257  These
considerations led in part to the Federal Circuit's declaration that
inequitable conduct charges had become an "absolute plague" in
patent litigation.258 Due to these undesirable effects, "[a] patent
litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge
of 'inequitable conduct in the Patent Office' is a negative contribution
to the rightful administration of justice.' ' 59
Despite these dangers, some commentators and Federal Circuit
judges allege that recent decisions have lowered the requirements for
254. Hanft & Kems, supra note 17, at 5.
255. See, e.g., Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253,
1259 (Fed. Cir. 1997). But see Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d
1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[The accused infringer] cannot carry its burden simply because
[the patentee] failed to prove a credible alternative explanation.... The patentee need not offer
any good faith explanation unless the accused infringer first carried his burden to prove a
threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence.").
256. Hoffmnann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372.
257. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
258. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
259. Id.
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inequitable conduct and revived the pre-Kingsdown analysis.260 Some
courts appear to justify these lower requirements by stressing the
difficulty in proving intent. For example, many cases cite the familiar
adage that "intent can rarely be proven directly" zs a justification for
inferring intent from materiality. 26 1 To be sure, the fact that intent can
rarely be proven by direct evidence may increase the burden on the
accused infringer. That should not, however, be a justification for
lowering the requirements for intent. Indeed, this is the very purpose
behind Kingsdown's high inequitable conduct threshold. The
threshold is set high because an inequitable conduct finding was
intended to be limited to particularly egregious behavior.262 Some
judges have even stated that case law restricts an inequitable conduct
finding "to only the most extreme cases of fraud and deception.
263
Kingsdown does not suggest that the threshold should be lowered
because the element of intent is difficult to prove. On the contrary,
courts have acknowledged that it is equally inequitable to declare a
patent unenforceable absent sufficient evidence of deceptive intent.
264
V. A SHIFT IN THE ANALYSIS?
Up to this point, this paper has focused on cases that have been
criticized for broadening the requirements for inequitable conduct. In
two recent cases, however, separate Federal Circuit panels seem to
have applied a more strict interpretation of the inequitable conduct
doctrine. Thus, these cases demonstrate a heightened requirement for
the intent analysis. At the same time, they suggest a model for a strict
interpretation of inequitable conduct under Kingsdown.
260. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372-73 (Newman, J., dissenting). See also Ferring,
437 F.3d at 1203 (Newman, J., dissenting); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc.,
525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
261. See, e.g., Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1191 ("[I]ntent need not, and rarely can, be proven by
direct evidence") (quoting Merck & Co., Inc., v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422
(Fed. Cir. 1989)); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Direct evidence of intent or proof of deliberate scheming is rarely
available in instances of inequitable conduct" and thus "intent may be inferred where a patent
applicant knew, or should have known, that withheld information would be material.").
262. Aventis Pharna, 525 F.3d at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1349.
264. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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A. Star Scientific
In the case of Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.,265 the court applied reasoning similar to Kingsdown. The
invention in Star involved a tobacco curing process intended to lower
the levels of carcinogens known as tobacco specific nitrosamines
(TSNAs) within cured tobacco. 266 Star engaged an attorney to
prosecute a patent application for the process.267 At the beginning of
patent prosecution, the attorney received a letter disclosing a Chinese
process that also yielded low TSNA levels.2 68 After considering the
letter, the attorney concluded that it was not material to the
application. 269 The attorney subsequently filed a provisional patent
application followed by a utility application, but he never disclosed
the letter or its contents to the PTO.27 ° Shortly after the utility
application was filed, Star terminated the prosecuting attorney's firm
and transferred the application file to a new firm. 27 ' The new
prosecuting attorney examined the file for prior art but failed to notice
the letter.272 The PTO ultimately allowed the application and issued a
patent.2 73
Star subsequently brought suit against RJR for patent
infringement. After the application was allowed, but before it issued
as a patent, Star's trial counsel learned about the letter and informed
274the new patent prosecution counsel of its existence. Upon
consideration, the new patent prosecution counsel also determined
that the letter was not material and thus did not need to be disclosed to
the PTO.27 5 Nonetheless, the district court later ruled that this
omission constituted inequitable conduct that rendered Star's patents
unenforceable.27 6 The district court inferred deceptive intent based on
the theory that Star transferred patent prosecution to prevent the
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1361.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1361-62.
269. Id. at 1362.
270. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1362.
271. Id. at 1363.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.
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previous prosecuting attorney from disclosing the letter to the PTO
and to purposely keep the new firm ignorant of the letter.2 77
At the outset of the opinion, the court highlighted the
requirements for a finding of inequitable conduct, stressing that "[t]he
burden of proving inequitable conduct lies with the accused
infringer. '' 278 Discussing the materiality and intent elements, the court
further noted that "at least a threshold level of each element.., must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence., 279 The court
emphasized the necessity for elevated standards in the inequitable
conduct analysis, declaring that "[t]he need to strictly enforce the
burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the inequitable
conduct context is paramount., 280 Just as it is inequitable to allow a
patentee to obtain a patent through deliberate misrepresentation, "it is
also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee
only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability. 281
Accordingly, "courts must ensure that an accused infringer asserting
inequitable conduct has met his burden on materiality and deceptive
intent with clear and convincing evidence before exercising its
discretion on whether to render a patent unenforceable. 282
Additionally, the decision noted that a finding of inequitable conduct
is not mandatory, stating that even when both elements are
established by clear and convincing evidence, "the court may still
decline to render the patent unenforceable."
283
Specifically addressing the intent element, the decision
emphasized that "materiality does not presume intent.
Acknowledging that intent may be inferred from indirect and
circumstantial evidence, the court noted that "such evidence must still
be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser evidence
cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement., 285 Furthermore, the
277. Id. at 1367.
278. Id. at 1365.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1366.
282. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
283. Id. at 1365.
284. Id. at 1366 (quoting GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Further, the court noted that "clear and convincing evidence must prove that an applicant
had the specific intent to ...mislead[] or deceiv[e] the PTO." Id. (quoting Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
285. Id. Compare Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(stating that "the district court was permitted to balance the relatively weak evidence of intent")
(emphasis added).
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inference must not only be reasonable, "but it must also be the single
most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence to meet
the clear and convincing standard., 286 Thus, the court may not balance
the equities until "adequate showings are made as to both materiality
and deceptive intent" by clear and convincing evidence. 87
Turning to the merits of the case, the court found that Star's
conduct was not sufficient to warrant an inequitable conduct finding.
Specifically, the alleged infringer had failed to prove intent by clear
and convincing evidence. While the district court did not find the
testimony of Star's witnesses to be credible regarding the reason for
changing law firms, this was insufficient to warrant an inequitable
conduct finding.288 The court emphasized that even if the applicant's
explanations could not be believed, it remained the defendant's
burden to prove its allegation. 289 Thus, the "[accused infringer] cannot
carry its burden simply because [the applicant] failed to prove a
credible alternative explanation., 290 Indeed, "the patentee need not
offer any good faith explanation unless the accused infringer first
carried his burden to prove a threshold level of intent to deceive by
clear and convincing evidence. 29'
On another note, the court did not follow Critikon's approach in
inferring intent from materiality.292 Finding that the district court's
ruling of deceptive intent was clearly erroneous as to one of the
patents at issue, the court declined to address the materiality of the
293
omission. This is consistent with Kingsdown, where the court also
refused to consider materiality after finding there was insufficient
evidence of intent.294
B. Abbott
The Federal Circuit also refused to find inequitable conduct in
the recent case of Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc. 295 The patents
at issue centered on extended release versions of the antibiotic drug
286. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
287. Id. at 1367.
288. Id. at 1368.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Part III.A.1.
293. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1368 n.8.
294. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("Because of our decision on intent, it is unnecessary to discuss materiality.").
295. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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clarithromycin.296 In this case, the defendant appealed a decision of
the district court refusing to hold two patents unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct.297 Regarding the first patent ('718 patent), the
defendant pointed to three separate omissions during prosecution as
allegedly establishing inequitable conduct.298  The court only
addressed intent for two of these omissions, finding that the third
omission was not material.299
As to the first omission, one of the inventors submitted a
declaration during patent prosecution comparing the formulation of
the pending application with the formulation of a prior art patent the
plaintiff owned.3 °° In her declaration, the inventor included data
showing that certain pharmacokinetic properties differed between the
prior art formulation and the pending formulation. 30 1 The declaration
further stated that these differences were statistically significant.30
2
Nonetheless, during litigation, she acknowledged that she had not
actually analyzed statistical significance.30 3 Further, it could not be
definitively concluded from the data whether the differences were
statistically significant.30 4 As a result, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff had committed inequitable conduct before the PTO.3 °5
Addressing this argument, the majority noted that "[w]e have
been directed to no evidence of deceptive intent, or 'bad faith or
intentional misconduct.' 30 6 The court also noted with approval the
district court's ruling that intent is not "inferred from materiality
alone, for precedent requires independent proof of deceptive
intent., 307  Thus, the Federal Circuit declined the defendant's
invitation to infer deceptive intent from the misstatement.30 8
Next, the defendant alleged inequitable conduct based on the
plaintiffs failure to provide to the PTO the results of certain clinical
296. Id. at 1343.
297. Id. at 1344.
298. Id. at 1353, 1355-56.
299. Id. at 1356.
300. Id. at 1353.
301. Id.
302. Abbott, 544 F.3d at 1353.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1353-54.
305. Id. at 1354.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1354-55 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
308. Id. at 1355.
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studies that were conducted after the patent application was filed.309
These studies, focusing on taste perversion tests, were provided to the
FDA and included on the product label.310 According to the
defendant, the plaintiff should have provided these results to the PTO
since, contrary to the information in the application, they indicated
that the immediate release version had lower taste perversion than the
extended release version.31 1 In response, the plaintiff noted that the
taste perversion tests "were from dosages that were not directly
comparable, and that they did not change the correctness of the data
in the patent application."
'3 1 2
Once again, "the district court observed that there was no
evidence of deliberate withholding of this ;nformation in order to
deceive the patent examiner." 313 Addressing the district court's ruling,
the Federal Circuit emphasized that "[m]ateriality is not evidence of
intent, which must be established as a separate factual element of a
discretionary ruling of inequitable conduct. 3 14 Since the court found
insufficient evidence of deceitful intent, it disposed of the inequitable
conduct charge.
Turning to the second patent ('616 patent), the defendant again
alleged inequitable conduct based on the plaintiffs failure to report
certain clinical trial results to the PTO. 315 The court found that
"[t]here was no evidence of intent to deceive with respect to the
results of these clinical trials." 316 The court went on to note:
Materiality, even if found, does not establish intent. This is not a
case of new information that affects the fundamental invention;
this is a case of challenging every action or inaction of the
"conduct" of patent solicitation, although patentability is
unaffected. The purpose of Kingsdown was to bring patent practice
into the mainstream of the law and administrative practice. The
law severely punishes fraudulent practices, and the patent practice
includes recognition that the inventor usually knows more about
the field than does the "expert" patent examiner. However, routine
actions that do not affect patentability and that are devoid of
fraudulent intent are not subject to a different standard than other
309. Id. at 1355.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1356.
315. Abbott, 544 F.3d at 1357.
316. Id.
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inquiries into fraudulent procurement .... "It was to mitigate the
'plague' whereby every patentee's imperfections were promoted to
'inequitable conduct' that this court reaffirmed that both
materiality and intent must be established.
'
"
317
Thus, the court adhered to a rigorous standard for finding intent
to deceive the PTO. In so doing, the court emphasized that intent is a
separate factual inquiry and cannot simply be inferred from the
materiality of an omission. Further, to establish intent, the court
appeared to require actions approaching fraudulent conduct. This
seems to present a departure from several of the cases discussed in
Part III, supra.
C. Summary
In both Star Scientific and Abbott, separate Federal Circuit
panels appeared to strictly apply the intent requirement of Kingsdown.
Particularly in Star Scientific, the court outlined the rigorous
requirements for an inequitable conduct finding. In both of these
decisions, however, the court stressed that intent must be established
by a separate inquiry. Further, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the
challenger must prove both materiality and intent by clear and
convincing evidence before a court undertakes any balancing of the
elements. Though inferences may be drawn from circumstantial
evidence, such evidence must still be clear and convincing. Absent
such a showing by the accused infringer, these decisions recognize
that there is no requirement for the patentee to establish a good faith
explanation for an omission.
Again, while these particular cases adhere to a strict showing of
intent to deceive, it is not clear whether they represent isolated
instances or whether they represent a return to the heightened
requirements of Kingsdown. Considering the wide range of
inequitable conduct cases, it is possible that they merely represent
differences among panels. On the other hand, they may represent an
attempt to curb a return to the pre-Kingsdown "plague" of inequitable
conduct charges. Only time will tell if they represent a change in
inequitable conduct jurisprudence. At the very least, however, they
illustrate an acknowledgement by some judges on the Federal Circuit
that the intent element of inequitable conduct is to be strictly applied
and not simply inferred from a finding of materiality.
317. Id. at 1357-58 (quoting Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
All individuals associated with the prosecution and filing of
patent applications owe a duty of candor to the Patent Office. This
duty requires applicants to disclose all information that is material to
the patentability of an invention. In cases where an applicant
intentionally attempts to deceive the PTO, an accused infringer may
raise an inequitable conduct defense. Inequitable conduct provides a
potent defense to the accused infringer, rendering the entire patent
unenforceable.
Originally, the doctrine of inequitable conduct was applied in
cases where applicants committed fraud on the Patent Office or
engaged in other particularly egregious and intentional conduct. With
the expansion of the doctrine over time, however, litigants began to
grossly abuse the defense. Eventually, decrying the "plague" of
inequitable conduct charges, the Federal Circuit reiterated the
requirements for an inequitable conduct finding. In Kingsdown, the
court emphasized that an accused infringer must prove that an act or
omission was material to patentability and that it was made with the
specific intent to deceive the PTO. Lest the defense be applied too
lightly, the court stressed that both elements must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.
Despite Kingsdown's mandate, both judges and commentators
have criticized what they view as a subsequent return to the plague.
By allowing intent to be inferred from materiality, these observers
allege that courts have abandoned the strict requirements for an
inequitable conduct finding. Further, they maintain that inferring
intent where a patentee knew or should have known about the
materiality of an act injects a negligence element into the analysis,
contrary to Kingsdown's requirements.
Indeed, as these observers noted, a number of cases raise
legitimate questions regarding the intent element. For example, how
may courts infer a specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO based
solely on the fact that an applicant should have known that
information was material? How may the requirement for clear and
convincing evidence be satisfied by "relatively weak evidence" that is
"not particularly strong?" And how may knowledge of patent
regulations be imputed to an inventor as the basis for a finding of
intent when specific intent is required? These holdings create
potential for confusion and are difficult to reconcile with each other.
In the end, this paper recommends a strict application of Kingsdown's
requirements. Due to the severity of the unenforceability remedy,
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inequitable conduct should only be applied in extreme cases that
clearly show intent to deceive. Without this, innocent omissions may
once more serve as a basis for an inequitable conduct finding.
